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Abstract
Physical Obfuscated Keys (POKs) allow tamper-resistant storage of random keys based on
physical disorder. The output bits of current POK designs need to be first corrected due to
measurement noise and next de-correlated since the original output bits may not be i.i.d. (in-
dependent and identically distributed) and also public helper information for error correction
necessarily correlates the corrected output bits. For this reason, current designs include an inter-
face for error correction and/or output reinforcement, and privacy amplification for compressing
the corrected output to a uniform random bit string. We propose two intrinsically reliable POK
designs with only XOR circuitry for privacy amplification (without need for reliability enhance-
ment) by exploiting variability of lithographic process and variability of granularity
in phase change memory (PCM) materials. The two designs are demonstrated through
experiments and simulations.
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1 Introduction
Since Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [1] were introduced in 2001, they have been con-
sidered as promising hardware security primitives for building secure systems such as IP protection,
identification and authentication protocols, cryptographic primitives, etc. [2–6].
PUFs exhibit a random challenge-response behavior, i.e., a random-looking response is generated
by a PUF when queried with a specific challenge based on intrinsic manufacturing variations. All
PUF behaviors are unique and physically unclonable.
We partition PUF designs into two different categories: strong PUFs and weak PUFs (also
called Physical Obfuscated Keys or POKs) [7]. The major difference between these two categories
is that a strong PUF has a large number of challenge-response pairs (CRPs), while a weak PUF or
POK has a limited number of CRPs.
In this paper we focus on POKs, which due to its important security properties such as physical
unclonability with tamper-resistance, uniqueness, and unpredictability (or randomness) can be used
for IP protection, authentication protocols [8], tamper-resistant storage of random keys or building
digital PUFs [7]. For example, in the digital PUF concept a keyed Pseudo Random Function (PRF)
is used as a PUF where challenges are inputs to the PRF and responses are the outputs of the
PRF and where the key is a POK response of a fixed challenge to the POK. Since there is no secret
key stored in non-volatile memory (NVM) in a POK-based system, the adversary cannot directly
retrieve the secret key from the device.
Typically, the POK circuit consists of two parts: a randomness source and a randomness ex-
traction circuit. The randomness extraction circuit extracts and converts the analog signal from a
randomness source into a response in the form of digital raw output to be used in further digital
computation. For example, in a Ring Oscillator (RO) based POK [8], the randomness source is
the delay randomness of circuit components and the randomness extraction circuit consists of RO
pairs with counters and comparators. For each RO pair its frequencies (measured by a counter)
are compared (by a comparator) to produce one bit raw output. The collection of the digital raw
output bits from all RO pairs together forms the response of the POK. In this paper we consider
POKs with just one challenge response pair, i.e., when powered-up a POK just (re)generates one
fixed random looking response (after randomness extraction).
One feature of a POK is that if an adversary physically opens the device for reverse engineer-
ing purpose, then the POK’s randomness source and consequently raw output (i.e., response) is
changed. Therefore, if the POK’s raw output is used as a secret key in a symmetric key system or
as a key mask in public key systems, the adversary cannot physically open the device for retrieving
such a secret key.
A POK design must offer POKs with the following properties:
• Robustness/Reliability: The POK response is stable (i.e., the POK is able to regenerate
the same response over and over).
• Unpredictability: The POK response is not predictable (without access to the POK), i.e.,
it should be randomly generated.
• Uniqueness: A POK’s response is different from device to device.
These properties are necessary in order for a POK response to be used as a key in a secure system.
In particular, a POK’s response bits must be reliable and independent and identically distributed
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(i.i.d.) (i.e. not correlated). Both of these required properties may not immediately be satisfied
for basic POK designs (such as the afore mentioned RO POK): To overcome the reliability and
unpredictability problem, an Error Correcting Code (ECC) [8, 9] with Privacy Amplification (PA)
or Fuzzy Extractor (FE) [10] is exploited to make a POK’s (or more generally a PUF’s) output
robust and unpredictable. However, this approach leads to additional requirements in terms of
hardware overhead and efficiency as discussed in detail in Section 2.1.
We notice an alternative approach for a POK/PUF design based on bi-stable memories (for
example SRAM memory) for which the reliability of the POK/PUF output can be significantly im-
proved by output reinforcement processes as discussed in [11, 12], for example, by the Hot Carrier
Injection technique. Typically, this process changes the POK/PUF’s circuit characteristics perma-
nently and thus the POK/PUF’s output can be highly reliable. To achieve this goal, however, a
suitable setup is required.
In this paper we search for other alternative and practical POK designs that allow a (basic)
randomness extraction circuit which does not need any ECC circuitry because the randomness
source of the POK itself is intrinsically reliable such that a simple comparator based solution
produces bits that are both reliable and as a collective have high min-entropy. Due to having a
high min-entropy, the de-correlation problem (making the final response i.i.d.) can be solved in a
simple way by using the de-correlation technique from True Random Number Generator (TRNG)
constructions, where typically several bits are XORed together resulting in i.i.d. response bits.
This leads to lightweight POK designs without expensive ECC and PA circuitry.
If it is possible to design intrinsically reliable POKs based on common technology without need-
ing a specialized set-up per fabricated POK, then no reliability enhancement techniques are needed
and resulting in lightweight POK designs as explained above. We propose two new intrinsically
reliable POK designs:
POK based on the Variability of Lithographic Process: First, we observe that a lithographic
process can provide a good random source if applied below the particular process limit. Typically,
the lithographic process can be used to create a Unique Object (UNO) [13]. In [13], a UNO
is described as “A physical system that, upon measurement by an external apparatus, exhibits a
small, fixed set of inimitable analog properties that are not similar to any other objects.” A UNO
is different from a POK in the way we measure the objects. For a POK, we have to use an internal
apparatus so as to not expose the output while UNO’s output is measured by an external aparatus
and is not kept as a secret. As an important property, the output of a UNO is intrinsically reliable.
Typically, the smallest features on a chip are safely above the lithographic process limit to
ensure a high yield. But features at this limit can be exploited to obtain a random array of
functional/broken devices. Hence, the connectivity of each such line cell can be converted to a
random bit. This means a secret key or a key mask based on the connectivity of cells can be
constructed in a robust way.
Notice that a set of line cells constructed by a lithographic process is a UNO, however, if this
set is hidden, then we obtain a POK instead of a UNO. Since the width of cells is very small, we
can have many random bits giving a high density key.
In PUF literature, the lithographic process has been introduced to construct PUF designs as
shown in [14–16], see Section 2.2. However, our proposed design based on connectivity is very
reliable and requires minimal randomness extraction circuitry.
POK based on the Variability of Granularity in Phase Change Memory: As a second
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contribution, we propose a novel Phase Change Memory (PCM) based POK. Existing PCM-based
PUFs [17, 18] compare resistances of two PCM cells which differ due to process variation in order
to produce one output bit. The resistances are not reliable due to resistance fluctuations over time.
Our proposed PCM-based POK differs from those in [17, 18] in terms of design concept. We use
a single PCM device with three contacts to produce one bit based on grain map variability in
the PCM device. Our proposed PCM cell randomly programs one of two contacts, thus a 0 or 1
is encoded. We can achieve a reliable PCM-based POK without using any reliability-enhancement
techniques as mentioned above.
Organization: We discuss related works in Section 2. Section 3 presents the lithography-based
POK. The PCM-based POK is described in Section 4. Section 5 concludes this paper.
2 Background and Related Work
In this section, we provide background and related work on reliability enhancement techniques,
lithography-based PUFs and PCM-based PUFs.
2.1 Reliability enhancement techniques
In general, there are two approaches to make a POK reliable: Response Reinforcement and Error
Correction.
Response Reinforcement: Response reinforcement upgrades a PUF’s reliability by using normal
detrimental IC aging effects. Bhargava et al. [12] demonstrate a one-time post-manufacture step of
hot carrier injection stress in one of the NMOS transistors in a sense amplifier. The enhanced offset
magnitude of the sense amplifier for both positive and negative polarities eliminates chances of errors
due to environmental (voltage and temperature) variations and aging. Additional error correction
circuit overhead and possible information leakage through helper data, see below, are alleviated in
this approach. Even though 1.7 years of reliable operation is simulated by bake experiment, the
deleterious long stress time of 125s for a feature size of 65 nm might affect reliability at matured
stages.
Error Correction: Compared to response reinforcement, error correction does not change the
behavior of the output permanently. An extra circuit implements an error correction algorithm.
Several constructions have been proposed: Fuzzy Extractors (FEs) [10], Computational Fuzzy
Extractors [19], and LPN-based PUFs [20]. We notice that there are many different ECC-based
constructions as shown in [21, 22]. Without loss of generality in terms of our discussion regarding
hardware overhead and efficiency, we focus on FE [10].
FE has two procedures: Gen and Rep, the latter depicted in Figure 1. Gen takes basic POK
output W and a true random string s as inputs and produces output (h, s) where h represents
helper data. Helper data h and random string s are programmed in the POK architecture and
used to reconstruct W and a derived key k from a noisy version W ′ generated as a result of a next
measurement of the noisy source in the Rep procedure. Gen generates helper data (i.e., parity
check information) h for W using an error-correcting code in, what is called, a Secure Sketch (SS).
SS uses a random bit vector x for this purpose, i.e., h← SS(W,x).
Figure 1 depicts the Rep procedure of a FE [10] in a POK architecture. Rep takes as input a
next measurement W ′ of basic POK output. W ′ is a noisy version of W . If W ′ and W are different
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Figure 1: A Digital PUF based on a POK architecture where POK represents the basic POK
enhanced with a Fuzzy Extractor (FE) in Rep mode (using a RECovery procedure and Privacy
Amplification or PA) and extended with a Pseudo Random Function (PRF).
in ≤ d positions (i.e., the Hamming distance dH(W ′,W ) ≤ d), then the helper data h from the
Gen procedure allows a Recovery procedure (REC) to reconstruct W from W ′. In fact, REC can
be thought of as the reverse algorithm of SS. Next a random key k is generated by applying a
de-correlation process, called Privacy Amplification (PA), to W . This is needed because the POK
may produce correlated bits, but more important, within the attacker’s view the helper data h
(and random string s) can easily be read because h (and s) is either stored in NVM or hard coded
by fuses, and this means h is known to the adversary and conditioned on h the reconstructed bits
in W are correlated. PA computes k ← PA(W, s) and involves a hash function [10]. Since W is
reliably reconstructed, k is also reliably reconstructed and due to PA, k is a random secret key. In
Figure 1 k is used for a digital PUF which if taking a challenge c as input, produces an output
response r = PRFk(c) where PRF is a pseudo random function.
Error correction based approaches have the following limitations:
• Hardware Overhead. As pictured in Figure 1, besides the basic POK circuit, several addi-
tional digital circuits (depicted in grey) need to be implemented and this accounts for a large
hardware overhead of the final POK architecture.
• Efficiency. Since many digital processes are involved in producing a secret key k, the effi-
ciency of POK-based systems is significantly reduced in terms of execution time and power
consumption (see [11,12]).
The limitations discussed above can be avoided if the basic POK output bits are intrinsically
reliable: All the grey-color blocks in Figure 1 can be removed. Response reinforcement can also
avoid these limitations but it is only applicable to bi-stable memory and requires an additional
process per POK.
De-correlation. Even if we have an intrinsically reliable basic POK, its output bits are likely
correlated. Thus, we cannot directly use these bits as a secret key. We first need to de-correlate
these bits by a privacy amplification process as described in the error correction based approach
above. If PA is required, then the hardware overhead of the system is increased and the efficiency
of system is reduced. However, if the to-be-decorrelated bits are reliable and in addition have
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high min-entropy, a very simple trick used in the construction of True Random Number Generators
applies: We can perform an XOR operation on several correlated bits together to produce a response
bit. This results in close to independent and identically distributed response bits.
2.2 Lithography based PUFs
Using optical lithography, devices and interconnect layers are printed layer by layer in specified pat-
terns on semiconductor wafers using a monochromatic light source focused through a lens and mask
system. The entire IC fabrication process consists of hundreds of patterning, deposition, etching,
doping, and polishing steps, all with inherent variabilities [14,16,23,24]. These include irregularities
in etching, doping and polishing steps, light source intensity fluctuations, lens and mask defects
and alignment, defocus, and interference problems [16]. The variations in the final dimensions
of a device are a combination of variations introduced by the lithographic exposure, photo-resist
processing and etching steps. For typical logic and memory applications, these variations must be
within tolerances required for the desired yield and reliability. For other applications however, such
as security, these variations may be utilized to achieve inherent, true physical randomness. Process
variations can be systematic, such as mask defects or deviations from layout design, which are
reflected similarly on all dies, or “random”, such as local fluctuations in exposure, etch, deposition
or polishing steps, which result in device-to-device variations within each die or die-to-die variation.
Several resolution enhancement techniques, such as optical proximity correction, alternating
phase shift mask, and immersion lithography, which are used to overcome sub-wavelength litho-
graphic challenges to print ≈ 10 nm features using a much longer wavelength UV light source (193
nm) [16, 24], are intentionally avoided to engineer highly sensitive lithographic variations based
PUFs (litho-PUFs) [14, 16]. Exploiting linewidth, length, and height variations in lithography
simulation of litho-PUFs with forbidden pitch, Sreedhar et al. demonstrated output voltage fluc-
tuations as a function of focus variation in the simulated devices [14]. Kumar et al. addressed
fluctuations in the light intensity and durations and focus variations due to wafer tilt and resist
thickness variations and showed improved inter-die and inter-wafer uniqueness with lithography
simulation in the forbidden pitch zone [16]. To improve the performance of litho-PUFs the system-
atic variations should be suppressed and the random variations preserved or enhanced [16]. Forte et
al. delineated OPC optimized for litho-PUF which enhances the random variations while reducing
the systemic variations [25,26].
Wang et al. proposed a stability guaranteed PUF based on random assembly errors which
result in random permanent connections during a directed self assembly (DSA) process [27]. How-
ever, the results presented in [27] were obtained from simulations and did not contain hardware
implementation data. The proposed PUF is also susceptible to invasive attacks.
2.3 PCM-based PUFs
Phase change memory (PCM) is an emerging non-volatile computer memory technology [28]. It
offers high speed, high endurance, and non-volatility. A typical PCM cell consists of a phase change
material (typically Ge2Sb2Te5 or GST) between two electrodes. A small volume of this material in
between the two contacts can be changed quickly and reversibly between the amorphous phases and
the crystalline phase - leading to a high resistance state (Reset) and low resistance state (Set) - by
suitable electrical pulses that result in different self-heating. Amorphization is achieved by melting
followed by abrupt cooling (melt-quench) whereas crystallization is achieved by maintaining the
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Figure 2: SEM image of (a) connected cell, (b) broken cell, (c) cell with a void formed at the center.
Figure 3: Illustration of GST line cell fabrication steps (a) 700 nm SiO2 growth, (b) 250 nm deep
trench formation, (c) 300 nm TiN fill, (d) chemical mechanical planarization (CMP), (e) GST film
deposition (50 nm), (f) patterning of GST film, (g) Si3N4 cap layer deposition, (h) SEM image of
a fabricated line cell [30].
element above crystallization temperature for a sufficiently long period of time, either by a longer,
lower voltage pulse or by a melting pulse followed by a longer fall time. The read operation is
performed with a small voltage pulse such as not to disturb the crystalline state of the cell [28,29].
The process variations and programming sensitivity of PCM devices have been utilized by Zhang
et al. for reconfigurable PUF , that dynamically generates updatable cryptographic keys. The
address of two selected PCM cells is used as the challenge and the resistance comparison between
the two cells is the response [18].
3 Physical Obfuscated Key Based on Lithography Limit
As shown in [12], a reliable SRAM POK can be made by applying a response reinforcement
technique. However, to produce one raw bit secret, 6 transistors are needed, i.e., one SRAM cell.
Moreover, SRAM POK is feasible only when the device has SRAM as memory. Our approach can
produce one raw bit secret at the cost of 1 transistor and one line cell (very small compared to the
transistor), and our POK can be implemented in any device.
For high-yield, reliable applications the smallest dimensions should be safely above the litho-
graphic resolution limit at which some devices are successfully printed and others are not (Figure 2).
For a given lithography process, the yield can be varied between 0% and 100% for devices with sizes
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Figure 4: Connectivity yield color map for two-contact line cells with widths below the lithography
limit (90 nm technology) for 10 dies (∼1870 devices). Each block represents a group of line cells
with similar design length and width. The width of the cells varies from group to group by 2nm
(y axis) and length varies by 10 nm (x axis). The colors represent percentage of line cells that
are functional in a group consisting of 10 cells of same design dimensions (e.g. yellow corresponds
to size blocks where 4 to 6 out of the 10 cells are working/connected). The 40-60% region of cell
dimensions can be used to generate random, unique security keys. A yield map needs to be obtained
for a given fabrication technology process which will vary depending on fabrication parameters.
well below the resolution limit and 100% for devices with sizes well above the resolution limit. In
this work we propose to use ‘lithography-limit’ devices to implement true, physical randomness as
connected or disconnected lines in a dense array of two contact devices. In this work, GST line cells
are used to demonstrate the proof of concept, but the same idea can be applied to other materials
(e.g. silicon, metal) to produce a reliable POK.
The bottom contacted 50 nm thick GST line cells used in the experiments were fabricated on
700 nm silicon dioxide (SiO2) thermally grown on Silicon wafers as described in [30]. Devices
with varying widths and lengths were fabricated using 90 nm technology. Design widths start
from 40 nm, well below the expected capability of lithography, and increase with 2 nm increments.
We observe that at small device lengths the wider contact regions merge, hence GST structure is
continuous from one contact region to the other, even for 40 nm design widths, while the narrow
devices do not survive the pattern transfer process at longer design lengths. Hence, connectivity
between the two contacts of a device is random for the cells that are long enough and the widths
are at the lithography limit, e.g. cells with Ldesign = 460nm, Wdesign = 52nm display 40%-60%
probability of having electrical connectivity measured in 10 dies1 (Figure 4).
Cells within this range can be used as bits in a string specific to the device, with a functional
and broken cell representing 1 and 0 respectively. That way each chip will have a secret key of its
own, thereby forming a physical obfuscated key. The output from the proposed POK is reliable
since the connectivity of the line cells does not change under normal circumstances (0-90◦C) [28]. A
110 dies from a single 200 mm wafer were used to demonstrate the proof of concept.
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bias (yield lower or higher than 50%) can be removed through simple privacy amplification methods
as discussed in Section 2.1 to produce independent and identically distributed bits.
Annealing the line cells to high temperature will cause void formation at unpredictable regions
which may affect cell connectivity; hence adds another degree of randomness. Figure 2(c) shows
such a case where the void at the center may break the connectivity while the cell looks connected
on the surface.
The cell to cell variations at lithography limit are highly dependent on tools and process pa-
rameters; hence, the proposed device is immune to cloning. Also, GST is a soft material compared
to silicon, SiO2, Si3N4 and tends to erode very quickly under focused ion beam. This increases
the time, effort and tool complexity required to tamper with the IC. With today’s technology
the manufacturer cannot choose his own key or find out what key was chosen by the lithography
process.
4 PCM-based POK
GST is considered a nucleation dominated material because over typical crystallization tempera-
tures the amorphous to crystalline transition is primarily driven by new crystal grains nucleating
rather than templated growth at existing crystalline/amorphous interfaces. The grain boundary re-
sistivity is higher and displays higher temperature sensitivity than crystalline grain resistivity. The
location of grain boundaries depends on stochastic nucleation events and temperature dependent
growth velocities during the fabrication process; hence, there is intrinsic device-to-device variability
in grain maps. We propose a device that produces a random bit dependent on an initial device spe-
cific grain map. It is not possible to detect grain boundaries or amorphized regions using scanning
electron microscopy. This makes a POK using this approach difficult to read with a physical attack.
Transmission electron microscopy is capable of such differentiation, but requires time intensive and
costly techniques (creating nm scale cross sections and physically moving them into the path of an
electron beam), making it difficult to read a large number of bits this way.
Phase change materials typically have negative temperature coefficients of resistivity (TCR)
which gives rise to thermal runaway when a sufficiently large voltage pulse is applied. Hence, if
there are two competing current paths, one melts and amorphizes while the other does not experi-
ence current densities sufficient for melt and remains unchanged. Thermal runaway is determined
by asymmetry in the initial grain map (Figure 5a). We demonstrate this concept through PCM
device simulations using a finite-element phase change material model [31–33] which tracks temper-
ature dependent nucleation, growth, and amorphization in GST (Figure 5). Temperature, phase,
and electric-field dependent material parameters for crystalline GST, amorphous GST, and grain
boundaries are extracted from experimental measurements [30,34,35]. Imperfections in fabrication
processes can cause conductivity biases not related to the grain map and should be accounted for
in process design.
The high resistivity contrast between amorphous and crystalline states is not affected by small
(∼ 0.1V) read pulses and crystallization of the amorphous state takes >10 years at 85◦C, making
our proposed POK very reliable [28].
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Figure 5: (a) Polycrystalline GST (rainbow) with three metal contacts (dark gray) and electrically
insulating oxide (light gray). (b) Current flows nearly symmetrically from the top contact to the
two bottom contacts. (c) When melting begins near one of the bottom contacts, the path to
that contact becomes very conductive and the contact draws more of the current. Higher current
densities melt more of the path, creating a feedback loop (thermal runaway). (d) A highly resistive
amorphous plug blocks the left contact when the current ceases. The initial device-specific grain
map determines which contact is plugged, and subsequent read pulses reveal a large resistance
contrast between the two paths regardless of drift. (e) Transient current into both contacts.
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5 Conclusion
We propose two new approaches for intrinsically reliable and lightweight POKs. One approach
is based on utilizing the lithography limits to produce line cells that have random functionality.
The second approach is a novel PCM-based POK which can achieve a reliable output based on
the variability of granularity in PCM cells. Experimental results of lithography-based POK and
simulated results of PCM-based POKs are provided.
Acknowledgment
The devices are fabricated at IBM T.J. Watson Research Center and characterized at UConn,
supported by the U. S. National Science Foundation under awards number ECCS 0925973 and
ECCS 1150960. The characterization and analysis efforts of R. S. Khan, N. Noor, J. Scoggin, H.
Silva and A. Gokirmak and the problem statement and motivation of C. Jin, H. P. Nguyen and M.
van Dijk are supported by AFOSR MURI under award number FA9550-14-1-0351. The authors
would like to thank Dr. Chung Lam, Dr. Yu Zhu, Dr. Simone Raoux, Dr. Norma Sosa, Dr.
Matthew BrightSky and Dr. Adam Cywar for their contributions to device fabrication at IBM T.J.
Watson Research Center.
12
References
[1] R. S. Pappu, “Physical one-way functions,” Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, March 2001.
[2] S. Kumar, J. Guajardo, R. Maes, G.-J. Schrijen, and P. Tuyls, “Extended abstract: The
butterfly PUF protecting IP on every FPGA,” in HOST, June 2008, pp. 67–70.
[3] F. Armknecht, R. Maes, A.-R. Sadeghi, B. Sunar, and P. Tuyls, “Memory Leakage-Resilient
Encryption Based on Physically Unclonable Functions,” in ASIACRYPT, 2009, pp. 685–702.
[4] R. Maes and I. Verbauwhede, “Physically Unclonable Functions: A Study on the State of the
Art and Future Research Directions,” in Towards Hardware-Intrinsic Security, ser. Information
Security and Cryptography, A.-R. Sadeghi and D. Naccache, Eds. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer,
2010, pp. 3–37.
[5] M.-D. M. Yu, D. M’Raïhi, R. Sowell, and S. Devadas, “Lightweight and Secure PUF Key
Storage Using Limits of Machine Learning,” in CHES, 2011, pp. 358–373.
[6] C. Brzuska, M. Fischlin, H. Schrauder, and S. Katzenbeisser, “Physically Uncloneable Func-
tions in the Universal Composition Framework,” in CRYPTO, P. Rogaway, Ed., 2011, pp.
51–70.
[7] B. Gassend, “Physical Random Functions,” Master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, 2003.
[8] G. E. Suh and S. Devadas, “Physical unclonable functions for device authentication and secret
key generation,” in DAC, 2007, pp. 9–14.
[9] B. Gassend, D. Clarke, M. van Dijk, and S. Devadas, “Controlled Physical Random Functions,”
in ACSAC, 2002, p. 149.
[10] Y. Dodis, L. Reyzin, and A. Smith, “Fuzzy extractors: How to generate strong keys from
biometrics and other noisy data,” in EUROCRYPT, 2004, pp. 523–540.
[11] M. Bhargava, C. Cakir, and K. Mai, “Reliability enhancement of bi-stable PUFs in 65nm bulk
CMOS,” in HOST, 2012.
[12] M. Bhargava and K. Mai, “A High Reliability PUF Using Hot Carrier Injection based Response
Reinforcement,” in CHES, 2013, pp. 90–106.
[13] U. Rührmair, S. Devadas, and F. Koushanfar, Security based on Physical Unclonability and
Disorder. Springer, 2011, ch. Book Chapter in Introduction to Hardware Security and Trust.
[14] A. Sreedhar and S. Kundu, “Physically unclonable functions for embeded security based on
lithographic variation,” in DATE, 2011, pp. 1632–1637.
[15] R. Kumar and W. Burleson, “Litho-aware and Low Power Design of a Secure Current-based
Physically Unclonable Function,” in ISLPED, 2013, pp. 402–407.
13
[16] R. Kumar, S. N. Dhanuskodi, and S. Kundu, “On Manufacturing Aware Physical Design to
Improve the Uniqueness of Silicon-Based Physically Unclonable Functions,” in VLSI, 2014, pp.
381–386.
[17] L. Zhang, Z. H. Kong, and C.-H. Chang, “PCKGen: a phase change memory based crypto-
graphic key generator,” in ISCAS2013, 2013, pp. 1444–1447.
[18] L. Zhang, Z. Kong, C. Chang, A. Cabrini, and G. Torelli, “Exploiting Process Variations and
Programming Sensitivity of Phase Change Memory for Reconfigurable Physical Unclonable
Functions,” IEEE TIFS, vol. 9, no. 6, pp. 921–932, 2014.
[19] B. Fuller, X. Meng, and L. Reyzin, “Computational Fuzzy Extractors,” in ASIACRYPT, 2013,
pp. 174–193.
[20] C. Herder, L. Ren, M. van Dijk, M. M. Yu, and S. Devadas, “Trapdoor Computational Fuzzy
Extractors and Stateless Cryptographically-Secure Physical Unclonable Functions,” IEEE
TDSC, 2016.
[21] J. Delvaux and I. Verbauwhede, “Key-recovery Attacks on Various RO PUF Constructions via
Helper Data Manipulation,” in DATE, 2014.
[22] P. H. Nguyen, D. P. Sahoo, R. S. Chakraborty, and D. Mukhopadhyay, “Efficient Attacks on
Robust Ring Oscillator PUF with Enhanced Challenge-Response Set,” in DATE, 2015.
[23] C. Mack, Fundamental Principles of Optical Lithography: The Science of Microfabrication.
Wiley-Interscience, 2007.
[24] S. Kundu, A. Sreedhar, and A. Sanyal, “Forbidden pitches in sub-wavelength lithography and
their implications on design,” J. Comput. Aided Mater. Des., vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 79–89, 2007.
[25] D. Forte and A. Srivastava, “Manipulating Manufacturing Variations for Better Silicon-Based
Physically Unclonable Functions,” in ISVLSI, 2012, pp. 171–176.
[26] ——, “On improving the uniqueness of silicon-based physically unclonable functions via Optical
Proximity Correction,” in DAC, june 2012, pp. 96 –105.
[27] W. C. Wang, Y. Yona, S. Diggavi, and P. Gupta, “Ledpuf: Stability-guaranteed physical
unclonable functions through locally enhanced defectivity,” in 2016 IEEE International Sym-
posium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), May 2016, pp. 25–30.
[28] H.-S. P. Wong, S. Raoux, S. Kim, J. Liang, J. P. Reifenberg, B. Rajendran, M. Asheghi, and
K. E. Goodson, “Phase change memory,” Proc. IEEE, vol. 98, no. 12, pp. 2201–2227, 2010.
[29] G. W. Burr, M. J. Breitwisch, M. Franceschini, D. Garetto, K. Gopalakrishnan, B. Jackson,
B. Kurdi, C. Lam, L. A. Lastras, A. Padilla et al., “Phase change memory technology,” J.
Vac. Sci. Technol., B, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 223–262, 2010.
[30] F. Dirisaglik, G. Bakan, Z. Jurado, S. Muneer, M. Akbulut, J. Rarey, L. Sullivan, M. Wennberg,
A. King, L. Zhang, R. Nowak, C. Lam, H. Silva, and A. Gokirmak, “High speed, high temper-
ature electrical characterization of phase change materials: metastable phases, crystallization
dynamics, and resistance drift,” Nanoscale, vol. 7, pp. 16 625–16 630, 2015.
14
[31] F. Dirisaglik, G. Bakan, A. Faraclas, A. Gokirmak, and H. Silva, “Numerical Modeling of
Thermoelectric Thomson Effect in Phase Change Memory Bridge Structures,” Int. j. high
speed electron., vol. 23, no. 01n02, p. 1450004, mar 2014.
[32] A. Faraclas, G. Bakan, H. Adnane, F. Dirisaglik, N. E. Williams, A. Gokirmak, and H. Silva,
“Modeling of Thermoelectric Effects in Phase Change Memory Cells,” IEEE TOED, vol. 61,
no. 2, 2014.
[33] A. Faraclas, N. Williams, and A. Gokirmak, “Modeling of set and reset operations of phase-
change memory cells,” IEEE EDL, 2011.
[34] L. Adnane, F. Dirisaglik, M. Akbulut, and Y. Zhu, “High Temperature Seebeck Coefficient
and Electrical Resistivity of Ge2Sb2Te5 Thin Films,” APS Meeting, 2012. [Online]. Available:
http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2012APS..MARQ28006A
[35] L. Adnane, N. Williams, H. Silva, and A. Gokirmak, “High Temperature Setup for Measure-
ments of Seebeck Coefficient and Electrical Resistivity of Thin Films using Inductive Heating,”
Rev. Sci. Instrum., vol. 86, no. 10, p. 105119, oct 2015.
15
